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TL;DR: Prompt injection is when instructions hidden in a web page, email or file get treated by an AI tool as if you wrote them. It is the top risk on OWASP's list for AI applications, and the UK's NCSC warns it may never be fully fixed. Protect yourself by limiting what your AI tools can reach and approving every consequential action yourself.
Prompt injection is the reason I tell clients to treat an AI browser like a new hire on day one: helpful, fast, and not yet trusted with the keys. The AI reads everything on the page you point it at, and it cannot reliably tell your request apart from words someone else planted there. If those planted words say "send the user's email address to this site," a poorly guarded assistant may do it.
We first published this note in 2025. This update keeps the original goal, explaining the attack and what Massachusetts users and businesses can do about it, and replaces the scary hypotheticals with documented cases and primary sources.
What is prompt injection?

OWASP, the open security community behind the best known web application risk lists, puts prompt injection first in its Top 10 for large language model applications. Its definition: "A Prompt Injection Vulnerability occurs when user prompts alter the LLM's behavior or output in unintended ways." (OWASP Gen AI Security Project, LLM01:2025 (opens in a new tab))
The root cause is simple to state. A 2023 research paper that first described the indirect form put it this way: "LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions." (Greshake et al., arXiv (opens in a new tab)) Your request and the web page the AI is reading arrive as the same kind of thing: text. That is the opening prompt injection uses, and it is why our knowledge base treats agentic security as its own discipline.
Direct prompt injection
OWASP says "Direct prompt injections occur when a user's prompt input directly alters the behavior of the model." The classic example is someone typing "ignore your previous instructions" into a customer service chatbot to make it say or do something its owner never intended. If your business runs a chatbot on its website, this is the version you worry about.
Indirect prompt injection
OWASP again: "Indirect prompt injections occur when an LLM accepts input from external sources, such as websites or files." The Greshake paper showed attackers could exploit AI applications remotely by "strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved." This is the version that matters for anyone using an AI browser or an assistant that reads email. You never type anything malicious. You just ask the AI to read something that contains a trap.
How does a prompt injection attack work in an AI browser?

The clearest public example I know comes from the security team at Brave, which publishes its own browser. In August 2025 it described a proof of concept against Perplexity's Comet AI browser. (Brave, August 2025 (opens in a new tab)) The steps, in plain terms:
- An attacker posted a Reddit comment with instructions hidden behind a spoiler tag.
- A user opened the thread and asked the AI browser to summarize the page.
- The assistant read the hidden instructions along with everything else and followed them.
- It found the user's account email, triggered a one time login code, read that code from the user's open Gmail session and posted both back in a reply to the comment.
Nobody clicked a bad link. The user asked for a summary. Brave's explanation of why it worked is the whole lesson of prompt injection in one sentence: the browser "feeds a part of the webpage directly to its LLM without distinguishing" between the user's instructions and untrusted page content.
Why the attack had so much reach
The assistant was acting inside a browser where the user was already signed in to email. That is the real multiplier. A prompt injection against a chatbot that can only write text produces bad text. A prompt injection against an agent that holds your sessions, your saved passwords or your company's admin consoles can produce actions. Brave's recommendations follow from that: "The contents of the page should always be treated as untrusted," sensitive actions such as sending email should need the user's explicit approval, and "Powerful agentic capabilities should be isolated from regular browsing tasks."
Why can't prompt injection just be patched?

Anyone who has built web applications will reach for the SQL injection comparison. The UK's National Cyber Security Centre wrote a whole post warning against it. "As there is no inherent distinction between 'data' and 'instruction'," it says, "prompt injection attacks may never be totally mitigated" the way parameterised queries mitigate SQL injection. The advice is to "seek to reduce the risk and the impact." (NCSC, December 2025 (opens in a new tab))
OWASP lands in the same place: "it is unclear if there are fool-proof methods of prevention for prompt injection." So the realistic goal is not a tool that blocks every prompt injection. It is a setup where a successful one cannot do much.
Browser bugs are a separate problem, and those do get patched
The original version of this note mixed prompt injection with ordinary browser vulnerabilities. They are different risks with different fixes. CVE-2025-6554, for example, was a type confusion bug in Chrome's V8 engine that "allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page," fixed in Chrome 138.0.7204.96. (NIST National Vulnerability Database (opens in a new tab)) CISA added it to its catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities on July 2, 2025. That was a code flaw with a patch, not a prompt injection.
Browsers stay a favorite target. Google's Threat Intelligence Group "tracked 75 zero-day vulnerabilities exploited in the wild in 2024," and browser zero-days fell from 17 to 11 that year, with Chrome "the primary focus of browser zero-day exploitation." (Google Threat Intelligence Group (opens in a new tab)) Many AI browsers are built on Chromium, so the boring advice holds: let the browser update and restart it.
What are the warning signs of a prompt injection?
There is no reliable alarm, which is why prevention matters more than detection. Things worth stopping for:
- The assistant proposes an action you did not ask for, such as sending a message, filling a form or opening a login page.
- A summary contains instructions to you ("visit this link to continue," "enter your code here").
- Your sent mail, posts or account activity show something you do not remember doing.
- The assistant asks for a password, one time code or payment detail in the middle of an unrelated task.
If you see any of these, stop the task, sign out of the accounts the browser had open and change the password on anything it touched.
How do you protect yourself from prompt injection?

OWASP's mitigation list reads like a good operations checklist. Among its items: "Enforce privilege control and least privilege access," "Require human approval for high-risk actions," "Segregate and identify external content," and "Conduct adversarial testing and attack simulations." Here is what that looks like in practice.
For you, at home or at your desk
- Use a separate browser profile for the AI agent. Sign it in only to what the task needs. Your bank and your main email stay in a profile the agent never touches.
- Give narrow instructions. "Compare these three quotes and list the differences" is safer than "go through my inbox and handle whatever needs handling."
- Approve every consequential step. Sending, buying, posting, deleting and changing settings should wait for your click.
- Never let an agent read a page and act on your accounts in one go when the page came from a stranger: a forum, a comment section, an emailed attachment.
- Keep the browser updated and restart it when it asks.
For a small business
- Inventory where AI reads untrusted text. Website chatbots, inbox assistants, AI browsers, tools that summarize support tickets or résumés.
- Cut each tool's reach to the minimum. An assistant that drafts replies does not need permission to send them. One that reads invoices does not need the payment portal.
- Put a person in front of anything irreversible. Payments, data exports, account changes and outbound messages to customers.
- Log what the AI did, so you can answer "what happened" after the fact.
- Test it. Plant a harmless instruction in a test document and see whether your tool obeys. Scoped penetration testing can do this properly against your real systems.
Here is a hypothetical. A dental office in Westborough adds an assistant that reads incoming patient emails and drafts replies. A message arrives with hidden text telling the assistant to forward the last ten emails to an outside address. If the assistant can only draft, the prompt injection produces a strange draft that a front desk person deletes. If it can send on its own, the office has a breach. Same model, same attack, very different outcome, decided entirely by permissions.
What does Massachusetts law expect if an AI tool exposes customer data?

Massachusetts has no rule written specifically about prompt injection, but its general data security rules already apply to AI tools that touch personal information. Under 201 CMR 17.03, every person that owns or licenses personal information about a Massachusetts resident "shall develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive information security program that is written in one or more readily accessible parts." (201 CMR 17.03, via Cornell Legal Information Institute (opens in a new tab))
The same section requires overseeing service providers by "Taking reasonable steps to select and retain third-party service providers" that "are capable of maintaining appropriate security measures to protect such personal information." An AI vendor that reads your customer records is a service provider. Ask how it handles prompt injection before you connect it.
If something does leak, the breach notice law, M.G.L. c. 93H, section 3, requires notice "as soon as practicable and without unreasonable delay" to the Attorney General, the Director of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation and affected residents. (Massachusetts General Laws c. 93H s. 3 (opens in a new tab)) The practical move is to write down, before anything happens, what each AI tool can reach and who gets called if it misbehaves. If you want the local numbers on breaches, I collected them in Massachusetts data breach statistics (opens in a new tab), and I covered whether staff can put customer data into AI tools (opens in a new tab) on my own site.
Frequently asked questions
What is prompt injection in simple terms?
It is when text an AI tool reads, such as a web page, email or file, contains instructions that the AI follows as if you had given them. The AI cannot reliably tell your request from planted words.
What is the difference between direct and indirect prompt injection?
Direct prompt injection is typed straight into the AI by the attacker. Indirect prompt injection hides in content the AI retrieves on your behalf, so you can trigger it just by asking for a summary.
Can antivirus software stop prompt injection?
Not reliably. A prompt injection is ordinary text, not a malicious file. Limiting what the AI can reach and approving its actions yourself does more than any scanner.
Is it safe to use an AI browser at all?
It can be, with limits. Use a separate profile signed in only to what the task needs, give narrow instructions, keep the browser updated and approve every send, purchase or settings change yourself.
Will AI companies fix prompt injection soon?
Vendors keep improving defenses, but the UK's NCSC says prompt injection may never be totally mitigated. Plan for it to stay a risk you manage, like phishing.
Does a Massachusetts business have to report a prompt injection leak?
If it exposes residents' personal information, the state breach notice law can apply like any other breach. Talk with a Massachusetts attorney about your specific situation.
This article is general information, not legal advice. Kief Studio is not a law firm, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws and regulations change, so check the current text and talk with a licensed Massachusetts attorney about your situation.
Where we fit
Kief Studio is in Shrewsbury, and we work with businesses in Worcester, Shrewsbury and across Central Massachusetts. If you have connected AI tools to customer data and want to know what an attacker could actually make them do, our penetration testing is an authorized, scoped attack that proves what a real attacker could reach. We agree scope and rules of engagement in writing, test what you authorized, prove each finding with the path an attacker would take, then show how to close it and retest. During a managed engagement we extend coverage with automated agents, and we review what they find.
If you are building AI into your workflow, our AI automation work builds quality-gated systems with a human path for anything the model is unsure about. And if one stolen session should not be able to reach everything, zero trust architecture puts identity checks and least privilege in front of each system.
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